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Abstract
Why do so many high-priced acquisitions of entrepreneurial ﬁrms take place in network
industries? We develop a theory of commercialization (entry or sale) in network indus-
tries showing that high equilibrium acquisition prices are driven by the incumbents’ desire
to prevent rivals from acquiring innovative entrepreneurial ﬁrms. This preemptive motive
becomes more important when there is an increase in network eﬀects. A consequence is
higher innovation incentives under an acquisition relative to entry. A policy enforcing strict
compatibility leads to more entry, but can be counterproductive by reducing bidding com-
petition, thereby also reducing acquisition prices and innovation incentives.
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1“Companies like Cisco, Intel and Microsoft recognize the threat posed by nimble young ﬁrms
getting technologies to market at unimaginable speeds,” says Red Herring’s Brian Taptich.
“And they’re willing to pay extremely high premiums to protect their franchises.”
-Economist (1999)
1 Introduction
In the last decade, several acquisitions of entrepreneurial ﬁrms at high prices have taken place
in industries with network eﬀects. Table 1 lists the ten largest majority acquisitions completed
by Google, eBay, or Yahoo, where the target was founded later than 2000. A striking example
is eBay’s acquisition of Skype Technologies at $3.8 billion in 2005, only two years after it was
founded by the entrepreneurs Janus Friis and Niklas Zennström.
Target Founded Acquired Acquirer Price
Skype Technologies 2003 2005 eBay $3866 million
YouTube 2005 2006 Google $1539 million
dMarc Broadcasting 2002 2006 Google $1238 million
AdMob 2006 2009 Google $750 million
Right Media 2003 2007 Yahoo! $679 million
StubHub 2001 2007 Yahoo! $310 million
Zimbra 2003 2007 Yahoo! $300 million
BlueLithium 2004 2007 Yahoo! $252 million
EachNet 2000 2003 eBay $150 million
Maven Networks 2002 2008 Yahoo! $141 million
Table 1: The 10 largest majority acquisitions completed by Google, eBay, or Yahoo! before
2008 where the target was founded later than 2000. Source: Capital IQ.
But what can explain the prevalence of acquisitions of entrepreneurial ﬁrms at high prices
in network industries? How do they aﬀect the innovation incentives for entrepreneurial ﬁrms?
And should compatibility policy account for the market for entrepreneurial ﬁrms?
To address these issues, we develop a theory of commercialization and innovation in indus-
tries with network eﬀects. Central to our theory is that (i) the commercialization mode of the
entrepreneurial ﬁrm (entry or sale) does not only depend on the proﬁtability of entry, but also
on externalities associated with ownership of an innovation developed by the entrepreneurial
ﬁrm, and (ii) the value of gaining a competitive advantage in the industry depends on the
strength of networks eﬀects.
We show that high equilibrium acquisition prices are driven by a desire to prevent rivals
from obtaining innovations. Network eﬀects amplify the preemptive motive for acquisitions,
thereby leading to higher acquisition prices and innovation incentives for entrepreneurial ﬁrms,
but to less entry. The intuition is as follows. The value of acquiring an entrepreneurial ﬁrm for
an incumbent increases in network eﬀects both because acquiring the ﬁrm gives the acquirer a
lead over rivals, and because not acquiring it reduces the proﬁts as rivals gain a lead. When
the network eﬀects increase, both reasons for acquiring an entrepreneurial ﬁrm become more
important and the acquisition prices increase. Furthermore, the equilibrium acquisition price
increases more than the entry valuation, thus making the entrepreneurial ﬁrm prefer being
2acquired instead of entering the industry.
The business press contains numerous accounts of the mechanism we describe. One example
is Apple’s acquisition of the music site Lala.com. BusinessWeek (2010) described the acquisition
as follows:
"Late last year, Apple entered the bidding for the online music site Lala.com, after
Google and several other potential acquirers had gotten involved. The company
moved unusually quickly, closing the deal in a few weeks, rather than the more
typical two to three months. It was clear that Apple didn’t want to lose out again,
and especially not to Google".
The possibility of being acquired in a bidding contest between incumbents can act as a
strong incentive for innovation. As network eﬀects amplify the acquisition price more than the
proﬁts from entering, acquisitions can be particularly important for innovation incentives in
network industries.
This has implications for compatibility policy. One example where the competition authori-
ties explicitly required compatibility to facilitate entry into an industry was the Cisco-Tandberg
merger approved by the European Commission in 2010. Cisco is a company that provides net-
working equipment, data centers, and video conferencing solutions while Tandberg was a vendor
of video conferencing products. The merger was approved on the condition that Cisco divested
its protocol for video conferencing. The intention of the European Commission was explicitly to
increase compatibility to facilitate market entry.1 This is in line with a general understanding in
the literature on network eﬀects that mandating compatibility is desirable. As argued by Farrell
and Klemperer (2007) in their survey of the literature on network eﬀects: "ineﬃcient incompat-
ible competition is often more proﬁtable than compatible competition, especially for dominant
ﬁrms with installed-base or expectation advantages. Thus ﬁrms probably seek incompatibility
too often. We therefore favor thoughtfully pro-compatibility public policy".
Accounting for the market for entrepreneurial ﬁrms, however, shows that too much com-
patibility can be counterproductive by reducing acquisition prices and innovation incentives.
Increasing the degree of compatibility makes products more similar in the eyes of consumers as
less emphasis is put on network size. An increase in compatibility beneﬁts non-acquirers as they
beneﬁt from the acquiring incumbent’s network. The acquiring incumbent, on the other hand,
receives a smaller beneﬁt since non-acquirers have smaller sales. Consequently, the equilibrium
acquisition price is reduced since increased compatibility reduces the proﬁt of the acquirer as
well as increases the proﬁts of non-acquirers. This, in turn, reduces the innovation incentives.
At the same time, however, increased compatibility still increases the amount of entry,
despite reducing the entry proﬁts. The reason is that the acquisition price will decrease even
more in compatibility than entry proﬁts, since increased compatibility does not only reduce the
acquirer’s proﬁt but also increases the non-acquirers’ proﬁt.
While this points out a potential drawback of too much compatibility, we also show that
compatibility can be an important tool for promoting entry and ensuring bidding competition
1The European Commission noted that the "structural remedy facilitates market entry or ex-
pansion irrespective of where the competitor or its target customers are located". Source:
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/10/377.
3for entrepreneurial ﬁrms in the long run: a cost of monopolization is a reduction in innovation
incentives because of a lack of bidding competition for innovative entrepreneurial ﬁrms. This
suggests that mandating a too strict or too weak compatibility policy when an active market
for entrepreneurial ﬁrms exists could be counterproductive.
We have outlined the paper as follows. In the next section, we relate our paper to the
literature. We set up our model in Section 3 and Section 4 contains our main analysis: strong
network eﬀects favor acquisitions over entry (Subsection 4.1) and lead to high acquisition prices
(subsection 4.2) and to acquisitions promoting innovation incentives (subsection 4.3). In Section
5, we extend our model to consider the optimal compatibility policy in the presence of acqui-
sitions and argue that too strict or too weak a compatibility policy can harm the innovation
incentives. We provide a discussion of extensions in Section 6 and conclude in Section 7.
2 Relation to the literature
Our paper contributes to the literature on network eﬀects (see Economides (1996) or Farrell and
Klemperer (2007) for an overview) by developing a model of competition in network industries
that allows for innovation eﬀorts by an independent entrepreneurial ﬁrm and that endogenously
determines whether an acquisition of the entrepreneurial ﬁrm or entry into the industry takes
place. In essence, our theory combines elements from the literature on network eﬀects with the
literature on commercialization routes of innovations by outside entrepreneurs.
In the literature on network eﬀects, papers such as Farrell and Saloner (1985), Farrell and
Saloner (1986), Katz and Shapiro (1992) and Church and Gandal (1996) have studied how
expectations and installed bases can lead to too fast or too slow movement to a new technology.
In particular, installed bases could work as an entry barrier to new technologies, thereby delaying
a shift to a superior standard. Our setting is separate from these papers by allowing incumbents
to acquire the entrepreneurial ﬁrm as a way of deterring entry. We also allow the entrepreneurial
ﬁrm to innovate prior to entry. This makes it possible for us to show that increased network
eﬀects can lead to less entry but more acquisitions of entrepreneurial ﬁrms and that this, in
turn, can stimulate the entry of new technologies by increasing the reward to innovating for
entrepreneurial ﬁrms.2
Our paper is also closely related to the literature on R&D incentives and compatibility
policy in network industries. In particular, our paper relates to Kristiansen (1998) and Cabral
and Salant (2010), which both provide mechanisms for why compatibility can reduce innovation
incentives. Kristiansen (1998) studies R&D rivalry between ﬁrms and ﬁnds that network eﬀects
can cause ﬁrms to introduce incompatible technologies too early. Firms can mutually agree on
compatibility to reduce the incentives to introduce technologies too early. Cabral and Salant
(2010) study evolving technologies and standards and point out that only having one standard
can lead to a free-riding problem in R&D: one ﬁrm developing for the standard also beneﬁts
2From a formal perspective, our model is related to Cremer et al. (2000) and Malueg and Schwartz (2006)
who study asymmetries in the Katz and Shapiro (1985) model in terms of installed base. The asymmetry on
which we focus is a process improvement developed by an entrepreneurial ﬁrm leading to lower marginal costs
for the possessor of the innovation. However, one could equally well view our innovation as providing a quality
improvement or in a ﬁxed way shifting expectations the same way as would an exogenous installed base of
consumers (as the installed base works in Cremer et al. (2000) and Malueg and Schwartz (2006)).
4other ﬁrms with the same standard. Having two competing standards (less compatibility)
improves the innovation incentives because now ﬁrms with diﬀerent standards compete with
each other in terms of R&D. We diﬀer by focusing on how compatibility aﬀects the innovation
incentives for entrepreneurial ﬁrms. In our setting, compatibility reduces innovation incentives
by reducing the equilibrium acquisition price and thus, the reward for innovating. Thereby, we
can derive predictions on how compatibility does not only aﬀect innovation incentives, but also
how innovations are commercialized.
The literature on the commercialization of innovations has shown that commercialization
by sale (or by licensing) is more likely when entry costs are high, the entrepreneurial ﬁrm
lacks complementary assets, brokers facilitating trade are available, the expropriation problem
associated with asset transfers is low, and the intensity of product market competition is high
(Anton and Yao (1994), Gans and Stern (2000), Gans and Stern (2003), Gans et al. (2002), and
Norbäck and Persson (2009)). We add to this literature by examining how network eﬀects and
compatibility aﬀect the commercialization route and equilibrium acquisition prices. This allows
us to gain a better understanding of how market-speciﬁc characteristics such as network eﬀects
aﬀect the commercialization mode and also allows us to study how compatibility policy in an
industry can aﬀect the commercialization route of innovations.
3 A model of acquisitions, entry and innovation in network in-
dustries
We analyze a model of acquisitions, entry and innovation in an oligopoly market characterized
by network eﬀects. The structure of the game is illustrated in Figure 1. In stage one, an entre-
preneurial ﬁrm undertakes an eﬀort to discover an innovation. In stage two, the entrepreneurial
ﬁrm decides whether to enter the market or put itself up for sale through an auction where
n symmetric incumbents are the bidders. There could then be exits of incumbent ﬁrms. In
stage three, product market competition takes place between the ﬁrms in the network industry,
one of which has the innovation. The game is solved in a standard fashion though backward
induction.
3.1 Stage 3: product market competition
The ﬁnal stage of the game is the product market competition stage where ﬁrms compete in
oligopoly. Consumers make their purchase decisions based on the expected sizes of each ﬁrm’s
network (number of consumers). Deﬁne the strength of the network eﬀect as z ∈ [0,1], where
z = 0 corresponds to no network eﬀects. One ﬁrm owns an innovation of quality k ∈ R+. The
innovation was developed by the entrepreneurial ﬁrm in stage one, and the owner is now either
the entrant or an incumbent that acquired the entrepreneurial ﬁrm in stage two.
Firm j chooses an action xj to maximize πj(xj,x−j,l,k,z) − τ, which depends on its own
action xj, its rivals’ actions x−j, the owner of the innovation, l, the quality of the innovation,
k, network eﬀects, z and an operating ﬁxed cost, τ.
We make the assumption that given the expectations of network sizes, there exists a unique
Nash equilibrium in actions: x∗(l,k,z) = {x∗
j(l,k,z),x∗
−j(l,k,z)}. The reduced-form prod-
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Figure 1: The timing of the game.
6uct market proﬁt function for ﬁrm j can then be deﬁned as πj(l) − τ = πj(l,k,z) − τ =
πj(x∗(l,k,z),l,k,z)−τ. As incumbent ﬁrms are symmetric, we only need to keep track of two
types of ownership: entry into the market (l = e) and sale to an incumbent (l = i). There are
then three types of ﬁrms, the entering entrepreneurial ﬁrm (h = E), the acquiring incumbent
(h = A) and non-acquiring incumbents (h = N), with reduced form proﬁt functions πA(i) − τ,
πE(e) − τ and πN (l) − τ. For future reference, denote the proﬁts of an incumbent ﬁrm if the
entrepreneurial ﬁrm did not manage to discover the innovation for each of the n incumbent
ﬁrms in the market as πN(0) − τ = πN(x∗(0,z),z) −τ.
Deﬁne the quality of the innovation by its eﬀect on reduced-form proﬁts.
Deﬁnition 1 dπA(i)/dk > 0, dπE(e)/dk > 0, and dπN(l)/dk < 0.
Our focus is on high-quality innovations. A central assumption of our model is that the
reduced-form proﬁt for the possessor of an innovation is strictly increasing in the strength of
the network eﬀects, while increased network eﬀects strictly decrease the rivals’ proﬁts.
Assumption 1 The quality of the innovation k is suﬃciently high for stronger network ef-
fects to create an advantage of possessing the innovation: k >   k such that dπA(i)/dz > 0,
dπE(e)/dz > 0, and dπN (l)/dz < 0.
This assumption captures an important dynamic in network industries: getting a lead on
rivals in terms of quality is more important when network eﬀects are strong. We are not the ﬁrst
to make this claim. Liebowitz and Margolis (2001) argue that quality largely explains success
in software markets, which suggests that higher quality attracts more users and that the eﬀect
on market share and proﬁts is then larger the stronger are the network eﬀects. Farrell and Katz
(1998) argue that network eﬀects amplify the advantage of owning an innovation if expectations
of network sizes track quality, or if consumers have rational expectations and the innovation
gives the acquirer a higher quality product. Empirical evidence is also available: Tellis et al.
(2009) show that the presence of network eﬀects enhances the eﬀect of quality on market share
using data from 19 markets with network eﬀects.
To further support Assumption 1, let us now show that this assumption holds when the
quality of the innovation k is suﬃciently high in the linear Cournot model with network eﬀects
outlined in Katz and Shapiro (1985).
3.1.1 The linear Cournot model
Suppose that ﬁrms compete in a homogenous goods Cournot industry. First, consumers make
their purchase decisions based on the expected size of each ﬁrm’s network. Second, ﬁrms set the
quantities to produce, taking consumers’ expectations as given. Following Katz and Shapiro
(1985), we focus on a Fulﬁlled Expectations Cournot equilibrium where consumers’ expected
size of the networks corresponds to ﬁrms’ optimal output decisions.
Formally, let   qj denote the expected size of ﬁrm j’s network and let   q−j be the combined
expected size of ﬁrm j’s competitors’ networks. Denote total aggregate output as Q =
 
j qj.
Then, ﬁrm j faces a price of
Pj = a + z  qj − Q (1)
7where once more the strength of the network eﬀects is given by z ∈ [0,1].
Firms maximize proﬁts πj − τ = (Pj − δj)qj − τ, where δj is ﬁrm j’s marginal costs. The
ﬁrm possessing the innovation (an incumbent or the entrepreneurial ﬁrm) is assumed to have
a marginal cost of δj = δ − k, whereas all other ﬁrms have marginal costs equal to δj = δ.




= Pj − δj − q∗
j = 0,∀j. (2)
Solving for Nash-outputs we obtain qj(l,   qj,   q−j). Assuming that consumers’ expectations are
correct, qj =   qj and   q−j =   q−j, equation (1) and equation (2) can be used to solve for Cournot
outputs consistent with fulﬁlled consumer expectations (omitting k and z for brevity): q∗(l) =
{q∗
j(l),q∗
−j(l)}. From equation (2), the reduced-form proﬁt function for ﬁrm j is then πj(l)−τ =
[Pj(l) − δj]q∗
j(l) − τ = [q∗
j(l)]2 − τ.
We can now study how the reduced form proﬁt functions of the diﬀerent ﬁrm types πA(i),
πE(e) and πN (l) respond to changes in z. We have the following lemma:
Lemma 1 In the linear Cournot model with fulﬁlled consumer expectations, when the quality
of the innovation is suﬃciently high, k >   k, stronger network eﬀects increase the proﬁt when
possessing the innovation while decreasing the proﬁt of non-acquiring incumbents: dπA(i)/dz >
0, dπE(e)/dz > 0, and dπN (l)/dz < 0.
Proof. See Appendix A.
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h(l), represents a direct price eﬀect which is positive









dz represents the strategic price eﬀect arising from the change
in price from the induced change in the output of competitors from stronger network eﬀects.
The sum of the direct and strategic price eﬀect times a ﬁrm’s output determines the total eﬀect
in equation 3.
With symmetric ﬁrms, it is easily shown that the direct eﬀect of stronger consumer will-
ingness to pay will always dominate, and ﬁrms’ proﬁts will increase under stronger network
eﬀects. The possession of the innovation, however, introduces an asymmetry between ﬁrms,
which beneﬁts the possessor at the expense of a non-possessor.
To see this, consider Figure 2 (i) and assume that we have a duopoly. In the benchmark
equilibrium D0, network eﬀects are absent z = 0 and the innovation quality is set to zero k = 0.
Firms have identical sales q0
h = q0
h, where q0
h is the output for the possessor of the innovation
h = {E,A} (the entrepreneurial ﬁrm or an acquiring incumbent) and q0
N is the output for the
non-acquiring incumbent. Since an innovation with positive quality k > 0 reduces the marginal
cost for the possessor, this ﬁrm can credibly commit to a higher output, shifting up its reaction
8function from R0
h(qN) to Rh(qN) along the reaction function of the non-acquirer RN(qN). The
equilibrium shifts from the symmetric equilibrium D0 to the asymmetric equilibrium D. In D,
the possessor produces a higher output than the non-acquiring incumbent, qD
h (l) > qD
N(l).
Figure 2 (ii) depicts how ﬁrms change their equilibrium sales. Adding network eﬀects z > 0
shifts out ﬁrms’ reaction functions: at a given output of the competitor, ﬁrms are willing to
sell more when the consumers’ willingness to pay increases. But ﬁrms also become more sensi-
tive to changes in the competitor’s output: the reaction function of the non-acquirer becomes
ﬂatter, while the reaction function of the possessor becomes steeper. This mirrors the fact that
consumers are more attracted to a network with a larger number of expected customers (larger
expected sales), and expansion by the competitor is met by a larger reduction in own output to
mitigate a fall in the ﬁrm’s product price. When the innovation is of suﬃciently high quality,
this will give the possessor of the innovation a competitive edge since consumers will prefer the
low-cost ﬁrm with a larger customer base. Comparing the Nash-equilibrium with network eﬀects
in point D∗ with that without network eﬀects in D, we see that the output of the possessor will
increase in the presence of network eﬀects, while the output of the non-acquiring incumbent
will decrease. This illustrates how the non-acquiring incumbent could face a negative strategic
eﬀect in equation (3) (since the possessor expands, −
dq∗
−N(l)
dz < 0), while the possessor (the
entrepreneurial ﬁrm or an acquiring incumbent) faces a positive strategic eﬀect in equation (3),




In the Appendix, we show that the direct eﬀect always dominates the strategic eﬀect for
the possessor,
dπh(l)
dz > 0 for h = {A,E}. The opposite,
dπN(l)
dz < 0, holds for a non-acquiring
incumbent, if the combination of innovation quality and network strength is suﬃciently high.
The latter is shown in Figure 3, once more using the duopoly case. The downward sloping
locus ˆ z(k) depicts combinations of the size of the innovation (k) and network eﬀects (z) where
dπN(l)
dz = 0. Above (below) this locus, the non-acquirer’s proﬁt decreases (increases) in network
strength. At some   k(l) = 0, we have
dπN(l)
dz = 0 and thus
dπN(l)
dz < 0 holds for   k(l) > 0 and
z ∈ [0,zmax(  k(l))], where zmax(  k(l)) is the highest network strength consistent with positive
proﬁts of a non-acquiring incumbent.
3.2 Stage 2: the commercialization mode (entry/sale)
Consider now stage 2 in Figure 1. If the entrepreneurial ﬁrm fails in coming up with an
innovation, the market is entry stable with proﬁts of incumbents exceeding ﬁxed operating
costs while entrants cannot cover the entry cost F (so we have πN(0) − τ > 0 for all n ﬁrms
in the market). Given a successful innovation, however, there is ﬁrst an entry-acquisition game
where the entrepreneurial ﬁrm can decide either to sell the innovation to one of the incumbents
or enter the market at a ﬁxed cost, F. Given the mode of commercialization of a successful
innovation, non-acquiring incumbents potentially then exit the market.
The ﬁrm in possession of the innovation is assumed to always make positive proﬁts. Let k
be deﬁned from πE(e) − τ = F. We assume the quality of the innovation k to be suﬃciently
large k > k, so that πA(l) − τ > 0 and πE(e) − τ − F > 0 hold. Let n(l) be the number of























































Figure 2: Illustrating the reaction functions. Part (i) shows how the innovation shifts the
symmetric Nash-equilibrium without the innovation D0 to D. Part (ii) shows how network
















Figure 3: Illustrating how the sign of dπN (l)/dz varies with the quality of the innovation k
and network eﬀects z.
market M(l) fulﬁls the exit condition:
πN(l : M(l)) − τ > 0, πN(l : M(l) + 1) − τ < 0, (4)
where M(i) = n(i) and M(e) = n(e) + 1, where n(l) ≤ n.
The commercialization process is depicted as an auction with externalities. This is an
auction, studied in among others Jehiel and Moldovanu (1999) and Jehiel and Moldovanu (2000),
where the bidders’ valuations depend on the outcome if the bidder does not win the auction.
The n incumbents simultaneously post bids, and the entrepreneurial ﬁrm then either accepts or
rejects these bids. If the entrepreneurial ﬁrm rejects these bids, it will enter the market. Each
incumbent announces a bid, bi, for the innovation. b = (b1,..bi..,bn) ∈ Rn is the vector of these
bids. Following the announcement of b, the innovation can be sold to one of the incumbents
at the bid price, or remain in the ownership of entrepreneurial ﬁrm e. If more than one bid
is accepted, the bidder with the highest bid obtains the innovation. If there is more than one
incumbent with such a bid, each bidder obtains the innovation with equal probability. The
acquisition is solved for Nash equilibria in undominated pure strategies. There is a smallest
amount ε chosen such that all inequalities are preserved if ε is added or subtracted.
There are three diﬀerent valuations:
• vii = [πA(i) − τ] − λ(i)[πN(i) − τ] is the value of obtaining k for an incumbent, when
otherwise a rival incumbent would obtain k. The ﬁrst term shows the proﬁt when pos-
sessing the innovation k. The second term shows the expected proﬁt if a rival incumbent
obtains k, where λ(i) is the probability of remaining in the market as a non-acquirer if an
incumbent acquisition occurs.
• vie = [πA(i) − τ] − λ(e)[πN(e) − τ] is the value of obtaining k for an incumbent, when
otherwise the entrepreneurial ﬁrm would keep it. The proﬁt for an incumbent of not
obtaining innovation k is diﬀerent because of the change of identity of the ﬁrm that would
11otherwise possess the assets. λ(e) is the probability of remaining in the market as a
non-acquirer if entry occurs.
• ve = πE(e)−τ −F is the value for the entrepreneurial ﬁrm of keeping an innovation with
quality k and entering the market
We can now proceed to solve for the Equilibrium Ownership Structure (EOS). Since incum-
bents are symmetric, valuations vii, vie and ve can be ordered in six diﬀerent ways, as shown in
Table 2.
Lemma 2 Equilibrium ownership l∗, acquisition price S∗ and the reward RE are described in
Table 2.
Inequality: Deﬁnition: Ownership l∗: Acquisition price, S∗: Reward, RE :
I1 : vii > vie > ve i vii vii
I2 : vii > ve > vie i or e vii vii or ve
I3 : vie > vii > ve i vii vii
I4 : vie > ve > vii i ve ve
I5 : ve > vii > vie e . ve
I6 : ve > vie > vii e . ve
Table 2: The equilibrium ownership structure, the acquisition price and the reward.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Lemma 2 shows that when one of the inequalities I1, I3, or I4 holds, k is obtained by one of
the incumbents. Under I1 and I3, the acquiring incumbent pays the acquisition price S = vii,
and S = ve under I4. When I5 or I6 holds, the entrepreneurial ﬁrm retains its assets. When
I2 holds, there exist multiple equilibria. The last column summarizes the reward RE accruing
to the entrepreneurial ﬁrm as a result of discovering an innovation.
3.3 Stage 1: innovation by the entrepreneurial ﬁrm
Prior to the acquisition or entry stage, the entrepreneurial ﬁrm undertakes an eﬀort to discover
an innovation by selecting the probability ρ ∈ [0,1] of discovering the innovation. Let the
eﬀort cost y(ρ) be an increasingly increasing function in the success probability: y′(ρ) > 0 and
y′′(ρ) > 0. The expected net proﬁt of undertaking an eﬀort to discover an innovation is thus
  ΠE = ρRE(l) − y(ρ). The optimal success probability as a function of the reward ρ∗(RE) is
implicitly given from the ﬁrst-order condition
d  ΠE
dρ
= RE(l) − y′(ρ∗(l)) = 0, (5)
with the associated second-order condition (omitting the ownership variable l) equal to d2ΠE
dρ2 =
−y′′(ρ) < 0. As shown by the following Lemma (obtained by using the implicit function
theorem), the entrepreneurial ﬁrm’s innovation incentives (the optimal success probability) are
increasing in the reward.
12Lemma 3 The equilibrium probability of successfully innovating in stage 1 increases with the
reward: dρ∗(l)∗/dRE > 0.
4 The eﬀects of network eﬀects
Having set up and solved the model, we now perform comparative statics with respect to
network eﬀects, z. To simplify the following analysis, we start out by assuming large-scale and
market-neutral entry.
Assumption 2 The following holds:
(i) Large-scale entry: the entrepreneurial ﬁrm and the acquirer attain a symmetric market
position when exposed to the same market conditions: πA(i) = πE(e) when N(i) = N(e).
(ii) Market-neutral entry: the quality of the innovation is suﬃciently high so that in a
market absent network eﬀects, z = 0, entry by the entrepreneurial ﬁrm leads to the exit of one
incumbent: k ∈ (  k(e),  k(i)) where   k(l) is deﬁned as πN(l,  k(l)) = 0 for l = {e,i}.
(iii)   k >   k(e).
Large scale entry is illustrated in Figure 4 (i), which depicts the reduced-form proﬁt for the
entrepreneurial ﬁrm (if entry occurs), πE(e) − τ, and the proﬁt of an acquiring incumbent (if
an acquisition takes place), πA(i) − τ, absent network eﬀects, z = 0. Both proﬁts increase in
the quality of the innovation. When quality is low, k ∈ (k,  k(e)), the acquiring incumbent will
earn a higher proﬁt, πA(i) − τ > πE(e) − τ, due to the concentration eﬀect. At higher quality
k ≥   k(e), these proﬁts are equalized, πA(i) − τ = πE(e) − τ. To see why, consider Figure 4
(ii). Absent network eﬀects, the proﬁt of a non-acquiring incumbent πN(l) is decreasing in the
quality of the innovation. At k =   k(e), πN(e) = τ holds and entry by the entrepreneurial ﬁrm
then leads to the exit of one incumbent ﬁrm.
The concentration eﬀect implies that the proﬁt for a non-acquirer under an acquisition will
exceed its proﬁt under entry, πN(e) − τ < πN(i) − τ. Therefore, the exit of a non-acquiring
incumbent demands a higher quality under a sale, i.e.   k(i) >   k(e). As shown in Figure 4 (iii), it
then follows that in region k ∈ (  k(e),  k(i)), entry is market-neutral and does not change the total
number of ﬁrms in the industry which remains at n ﬁrms. In this region, an acquiring incumbent
and the entrepreneurial ﬁrm would obtain the same product market proﬁt πA(i)−τ = πE(e)−τ,
while a non-acquiring incumbents would obtain the same proﬁt regardless of the ownership of
the innovation, πN(e)−τ = πN(i)−τ. Note also that for a larger quality than   k(i), additional
exits occur. However, the number of ﬁrms in the market is the same under entry and sale.
Figure 4 (iv) adds network eﬀects under market-neutral and large-scale entry. Once we





Initially, we will focus on varying network strength in the region z ∈ (0,zmax(k)) for k > ˜ k ∈
(  k(e),  k(i)), where zmax(k) is the largest network strength at which a non-aquiring incumbent
makes a positive proﬁt. That is, we will assume that the quality of the innovation is suﬃciently
large to simultaneously generate exit of an incumbent under entry, while creating a suﬃciently
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Figure 4: Illustrating large-scale and market-neutral entry. Part (i) illustrates large-scale entry
and how the reduced proﬁt functions of posessors of the innovation vary with k. Part (ii) depicts
market neutral entry, showing that the proﬁts of non-acquiring incumbents decrease in k. Part
(iii) illustrates that we have entry neutrality in the middle region. Part (iv) depicts the exact
region on which we focus where Assumption 1 and Assumption 2 hold.
14We consider these assumptions to be reasonable, and refer the sceptical reader to sections 6.1
and 6.3 where we examine network eﬀects with innovations of lower quality (k < ˜ k) and market
neutral entry k ∈ (  k(e),  k(i)) as well as non-market neutral entry, k ∈ (0,  k(e)). Furthermore,
section 6.2 allows for exits at strong network eﬀects, z ≥ zmax(k), and "tipping": such strong
network eﬀects that only one ﬁrm can be active in the market.
4.1 Network eﬀects promote acquisitions over entry
Let us now show that strong network eﬀects can induce the entrepreneurial ﬁrm to sell the
innovation instead of entering the market. Using Assumption 2, incumbents’ valuations become:
vil =
 





vii = πA(i) − πN(i).
(6)
where vie > vii since the probability of remaining in the market for a non-acquiring incumbent
is lower under entry, λ(i) = 1 > λ(e) = n−1
n > 0.
From Lemma 2, commercialization by sale occurs as a unique equilibrium if and only if
vie > ve or vii > ve or both. It is then convenient to deﬁne the net value of preemption as
∆PE(z) = vii−ve and the net value of entry deterrence as ∆ED(z) = vie−ve. These net values
simply compare an incumbent’s valuation to the minimum price at which the entrepreneurial
ﬁrm will sell its innovation to an incumbent. Using Assumption 2, it follows from equation (6)
that the net value of entry-deterrence and preemption can be written as





∆PE(z) = vii − ve = F − πN(i).
(7)
The proﬁt as a possessor of the innovation vanishes in equation (7) since the proﬁt of an
acquiring incumbent equals that of the entrepreneurial ﬁrm under entry, πA(i) = πE(e). To
proceed, deﬁne cut-oﬀ levels for network strengths zPE from ∆PE(zPE) = 0 and zED from
∆ED(zED) = 0, and note that zED < zPE since ∆ED(z) > ∆PE(z) from vie > vii. We can then
state the following proposition:
Proposition 1 Under Assumptions 1 and 2 and under the existence of zPE and zED, entry
takes place if z ∈ (0,zED), an entry deterring acquisition at price S∗ = ve takes place for
z ∈ [zED,zPE) and a preemptive acquisition at price S∗ = vii occurs for z ∈ [zPE,zmax). Thus,
an increase in z makes an acquisition more likely.
The proposition is proved and illustrated in Figure 5, which solves the acquisition entry
game as a function of the network eﬀect, z. When network eﬀects are weak, z ∈ (0,zED), the
net value for entry deterrence is negative ∆ED(z) = vie − ve < 0, i.e. an incumbent’s entry
deterring valuation vie is lower than the entry value of the entrepreneurial ﬁrm, ve. In this
region, the entrepreneurial ﬁrm will choose to enter the market (l∗ = e).
What happens if there is an increase in the network eﬀects? Diﬀerentiate the net value of
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Figure 5: Network eﬀects in an industry aﬀect the entry/acquisition decision, the equilibrium
acquisition price and the innovation reward. Part (i) illustrates the upward sloping net value
of preemption and the net value of entry deterrence. Part (ii) illustates for what values of z
entry that an entry deterring acquisition, or a preemptive acquisition, takes place. Part (iii)
illustrates the eﬀects on the reward from increasing network eﬀects.
16Thus, the entry deterring valuation of an incumbent vie increases more than the entrepreneurial
ﬁrm’s value of entry ve when there is an increase in the network eﬀect. The ﬁrst term in




πN(e) increases by the same amount as the ﬁrst term in ve = πE(i) − F,
since the acquiring incumbent and the entrepreneurial ﬁrm have the same increase in proﬁt from
Assumption 2 (πA(i) = πE(e)). However, since the proﬁt of a non-acquirer πN(e) decreases in z,
there is an additional increase in the incumbent’s valuation such that dvie/dz > dve/dz. Thus,
since an incumbent’s net value of entry deterrence ∆ED(z) = vie−ve is increasing in z, an entry
deterring acquisition at the acquisition price S∗ = ve occurs at z = zED where ∆ED(zED) = 0
(shown in Figure 5 (ii)). Other incumbents will not preempt a rival acquisition in the region
z ∈ (zED,zPE), since the net value of preemption is negative, ∆PE = vii − ve < 0. Thus, the
entrepreneurial ﬁrm will be acquired (l∗ = i) at the price S∗ = πE(e) − F in this region.
What if the network eﬀects increase even further? Since a stronger network eﬀect decreases
the proﬁt of a non-acquiring incumbent under an incumbent acquisition, the net value of pre-







dz > 0. (9)
As shown in Figure 5(i), increasing the network eﬀect into the region z ∈ [zPE,zmax(k)) leads
to a strictly positive net value of preemption: ∆PE(z) = vii − ve > 0. This induces a bidding
war between incumbents driving the equilibrium acquisition price above the entry value for the
entrepreneurial ﬁrm, S∗ = vii = πA(i) − πN(i) > ve. The entrepreneurial ﬁrm will be acquired
(l∗ = i) at the acquisition price S∗ = vii in this region.
4.2 Network eﬀects increase the acquisition prices and the acquisition pre-
mium
Given that an acquisition takes place, how do network eﬀects aﬀect the equilibrium acquisition
price? Network eﬀects have a dual eﬀect on the equilibrium preemptive acquisition price:
the acquisition price increases in network eﬀects both because the bidders ﬁnd the innovation
gained through the acquisition to be more valuable and because they want to prevent rivals
from acquiring the entrepreneurial ﬁrm. Under an entry deterring acquisition, the acquisition
price is aﬀected by network eﬀects in the same way as network eﬀects aﬀect the proﬁtability of
entry.
This holds because if an entry deterring acquisition takes place, the equilibrium acquisition
price is S∗ = ve = πE − F. Since the acquisition price then equals the entry value, it follows










If a preemptive acquisition takes place at strong network eﬀects z ∈ [zPE,zmax), the equi-
librium acquisition price is S∗ = vii = πA −πN(i). It follows from Assumption 1 that the eﬀect
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> 0. (11)
The equilibrium acquisition price under a preemptive acquisition increases because i) the proﬁts
if the entrepreneurial ﬁrm is acquired increase in network eﬀects (dπA/dz > 0), and ii) the
proﬁts if the incumbent is forced to compete with a rival that acquired the entrepreneurial ﬁrm
decrease in the network eﬀects (dπN(i)/dz < 0). Thus, the acquisition premium (the acquisition
price paid by an incumbent in a preemptive acquisition net the entry value of the ﬁrm) is also
increasing in network eﬀects. As shown in Figure 5(iii), the acquisition premium is given by
∆PE = vii − ve, which by equation (9) is also increasing in z when the network eﬀects are
suﬃciently large.
Proposition 2 Under Assumptions 1 and 2 and under the existence of zPE and zED, the
following holds:
(i) the entry value of the entrepreneurial ﬁrm ve and the acquisition price under a sale S∗
increase when the network eﬀects increase,
(ii) when a preemptive acquisition occurs for strong network eﬀects z ∈ [zPE,zmax), the
acquisition price S∗ = vii increases more than the reservation price ve. This increases the
acquisition premium vii − ve.
Proposition 2 provides an explanation for why acquisition prices can be so high in network
industries: acquiring an entrepreneurial ﬁrm gives an incumbent a larger lead over rivals at the
same time as preventing a rival from acquiring the entrepreneurial ﬁrm becomes more important.
Bidding competition as incumbents expect rivals to acquire the entrant ensures that the bid
equals the full valuation vii.
4.3 Acquisitions promote innovation incentives in network industries
We have seen that stronger network eﬀects tend to promote acquisitions over entry and amplify
acquisition prices more under a preemptive acquisition than under an entry deterring acquisition.
But how do these eﬀects feed back into the entrepreneurial ﬁrm’s innovation incentives?
Proposition 3 Under Assumptions 1 and 2 and the existence of zPE and zED, under preemp-
tive acquisitions (z ∈ [zPE,zmax)), entrepreneurial ﬁrms face stronger innovation incentives
than under entry-deterring acquisitions or under entry, i.e. ρ∗(i) > ρ∗(e).
To prove this, we make use of Figure 5 (iii) which depicts the reward RE(l) as a function of
network strength z. When the network strength is low z ∈ (0,zED), entry will take place and
the reward is RE(e) = ve = πE(e) − F. From Assumption 1, RE(e) is increasing in network
eﬀects and from Lemma 3, the innovation eﬀorts increase when the reward for innovation
increases. The same holds if an entry deterring acquisition occurs in region z ∈ [zED,zPE)
since RE(i) = S∗ = ve.
18When the network eﬀects increase further, z ∈ [zPE,zmax), a preemptive acquisition occurs.
In this region, bidding competition among incumbents for the entrepreneurial ﬁrm causes the
reward for innovation to be strictly greater than the reward for innovation under entry or
an entry-deterring acquisition: RE(i) = vii > ve = RE(e). Since the probability of success
ρ∗(l) is increasing in the reward RE(l), it directly follows from Lemma 3 that there will be a
higher probability of success if there is bidding competition for the entrepreneurial ﬁrm and a
preemptive acquisition occurs. This is illustrated in Figure 5 (iii), which shows that preemptive
incumbent acquisitions of entrepreneurial ﬁrms substantially increase the innovation incentives
for entrepreneurial ﬁrms.
Proposition 3 thus provides an explanation for the fast innovation pace in network industries:
entrepreneurial ﬁrms know that they can get a large reward for innovating if they are acquired
by an incumbent competing with other incumbents to acquire them.
5 Compatibility policy in the presence of a market for entre-
preneurial ﬁrms
5.1 Incorporating compatibility
The required level of compatibility between products is often used in network industries to
achieve policy goals so as to ensure suﬃcient entry into an industry. To account for this,
we start by extending our model to account for both network eﬀects and varying degrees of
compatibility. Let the degree of compatibility between ﬁrms’ products be measured by c ∈ [0,1],
where c = 0 means that each ﬁrm’s product only beneﬁts from its own network (incompatibility)
and c = 1 means that each ﬁrm’s product beneﬁts from the networks of all products sold (full
compatibility).
In stage 3, ﬁrm j chooses an action xj to maximize its direct product market proﬁts
πj(xj,x−j,l,k,z,c) − τ, which now also depend on the degree of compatibility, c. Given the
expectations of network sizes, assume that a unique Nash equilibrium in actions x∗(l,k,z,c) =
{x∗
j(l,k,z,c),x∗
−j(l,k,z,c)} exists, allowing us to deﬁne the reduced form proﬁt function for
ﬁrm j as πj(l) = πj(x∗(l,k,z,c),l,k,z,c) − τ. We impose the following assumption:
Assumption 3 Increased compatibility levels the playing ﬁeld by reducing the advantage of




dc < 0, and
dπN(l)
dc > 0.
This eﬀect is termed "leveling" in the literature (Katz and Shapiro (1985), Farrell and
Saloner (1992), Malueg and Schwartz (2006) and Farrell and Klemperer (2007)). Empirical
evidence suggests that leveling takes place: Liu et al. (2008) document that increasing com-
patibility in the memory card market reduces the eﬀect of installed bases on price premiums
while larger installed bases increase price premiums. In other words, there appear to be network
eﬀects in the memory card market but the price premiums they allow are reduced when the
degree of compatibility increases.
195.1.1 The linear Cournot model
For clarity, let us consider how compatibility can be incorporated in the linear Cournot model
of Katz and Shapiro (1985). Consider the linear Cournot model with network eﬀects developed
in Section 3.1 and extend it to allow for compatibility between ﬁrms’ networks. Firm j now
faces a price of
Pj = a + z(  qj + c  q−j) − Q. (12)
The term c  q−j captures how much ﬁrm j beneﬁts from the quantities sold by rivals. Setting
c = 0, we have returned to the linear Cournot model developed in Section 3.1. Observing
expectations, ﬁrms maximize proﬁts πj = (Pj − δj)qj − τ, where δj is ﬁrm j’s marginal costs.




We can now study how the reduced form proﬁt functions πA(i)−τ, πE(e)−τ and πN (l)−τ
respond to changes in c to obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 4 For suﬃciently high-quality innovations, increased compatibility levels the playing
ﬁeld by reducing the advantage of acquiring the entrepreneurial ﬁrm: dπA
dc < 0, dπE
dc < 0, and
dπN(l)
dc > 0 for k > ˇ k.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Lemma 4 gives the conditions under which Assumption 3 holds in the linear Cournot model
with network eﬀects and fulﬁlled consumer expectations. To see this, diﬀerentiate the reduced













The ﬁrst term within the bracket ∂Ph(l)/∂c = Ψ∗
−h(l) = zq∗
−h represents a direct price increase









dc represents the strategic price eﬀect arising from the change
in price from the induced change in the output of competitors from increased compatibility.
Due to the possession of the innovation, a possessor has a larger network than a non-
acquiring incumbent. However, the direct eﬀect of an increase in compatibility now beneﬁts
non-acquiring incumbents more than a possessor because consumers in the smaller network of a




To examine the strategic eﬀect, it is instructive to once more examine a duopoly setting.
Figure 6 uses equilibrium D∗ from Figure 2 (ii) as a benchmark, where an innovation of high
quality is present under network eﬀects, z > 0, but networks are not compatible. This creates a
highly asymmetric market with the low cost possessor attracting most customers. Introducing
compatibility c > 0 shifts out ﬁrms’ reaction functions due to the increase in the willingness to
pay of consumers. However, this will disproportionately beneﬁt the smaller non-possessor since
this ﬁrm’s product attains compatibility with the larger ﬁrm’s network. The gain for the large






















Figure 6: Illustrating how reaction functions respond to increases in compatibility.
without compatibility in point D∗ with that with compatibility in DC, we see that the output
of the non-acquirer has increased while that of the possessor has decreased.
In the Appendix, we show that non-acquiring incumbents always gain from higher compat-
ibility. For suﬃciently high quality of innovations k > k, the possessor’s proﬁt decreases as the
compatibility increases from low levels. We also derive the range of compatibility under which
larger compatibility reduces the proﬁt of the possessor of the innovation.
5.2 Increased compatibility leads to more entry but reduced innovation in-
centives
We now perform comparative statics with respect to c to study how compatibility aﬀects the
entry/acquisition decision, equilibrium acquisition prices and innovation incentives. Required
compatibility is often motivated in the policy arena by its eﬀect to promote entry. We show
that indeed more entry takes place for higher compatibility, but this comes at the expense of
reduced innovation incentives under preemptive acquisitions.
Recall incumbents’ net values of an acquisition in equation (7). Diﬀerentiating these net















The net value of entry deterrence and preemption, ∆PE(c) and ∆ED(c), are decreasing in com-
patibility since non-acquiring incumbents gain from increased compatibility. This is illustrated
in Figure 7(i). If we assume that the combination of the quality of the innovation and the
strength of network eﬀects is suﬃciently high to support a sale under bidding competition ab-
21sent compatibility, we can deﬁne cut-oﬀ levels for compatibility cPE from ∆PE(cPE) = 0 and
cED from ∆ED(cED) = 0, where cED < cPE since ∆ED(c) > ∆PE.
As illustrated by Figure 7 (i), preemptive acquisitions occur at low levels of compatibility
c ∈ (0,cED) since ∆PE(c) = vii − ve > 0. This induces a bidding war between incumbents
driving the equilibrium acquisition price above the entry value for the entrepreneurial ﬁrm,
S∗ = vii = πA(i) − πN(i) > ve. However, as we increase the compatibility, incumbents’
value of preempting other incumbents becomes smaller than the reservation price and leads
to a negative net value, ∆PE(c) < 0. Since the net value of entry deterrence is higher than
the net value of preemption from the concentration eﬀect of an acquisition, incumbents’ value
of deterring entry remains higher than the reservation price for the entrepreneurial ﬁrm at
medium compatibility, ∆ED(c) > 0 for c ∈ (cPE,cED). Thus, an entry deterring acquisition at
the acquisition price S∗ = ve occurs in this region. However, when compatibility is very high,
c ∈ (cED,1), incumbents’ valuations are lower than the reservation price. In this region, the
entrepreneurial ﬁrm will thus choose to enter the market.
Proposition 4 Under Assumptions 1, 2 and 3, and the existence of cPE and cED, a preemptive
acquisition at price S∗ = vii occurs for c ∈ (0,cPE), an entry deterring acquisition at price
S∗ = ve takes place for c ∈ [cPE,cED) and entry takes place if c ∈ (cED,1). Thus, an increase
in compatibility c makes entry more likely and an acquisition under bidding competition less
likely.
From Lemma 3, we know that the probability of success ρ∗(l) is increasing in the reward to
innovation, RE(l). It directly follows that innovation incentives always decrease in compatibil-
ity, regardless of the entry mode. An increase in compatibility when the entrepreneurial ﬁrm
is acquired under bidding competition will drastically reduce the probability of success ρ∗(l).
Figure 7 (iii) depicts the reward RE(l) as a function of compatibility c. When compatibility is
low, such that c ∈ [0,cPE), a preemptive acquisition occurs at S∗ = vii. Then, the reward to
innovation RE(l) = vii will decrease in c both because the proﬁts when acquiring the entrepre-
neurial ﬁrm decrease and because the proﬁts when forced to compete with a rival that acquired
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< 0. (15)
Hence, the negative eﬀect on innovation incentives of increased compatibility is greater if a
preemptive acquisition takes place. We get more entry, but at the cost of reduced acquisition
prices which reduce the innovation incentives for entrepreneurial ﬁrms.
Corollary 2 Under Assumptions 1, 2 and 3, and the existence of cPE and cED, increased
compatibility reduces the reward to innovation for the entrepreneurial ﬁrm
dRE(l)
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Figure 7: The compatibility policy aﬀects the entry/acquisition decision, the equilibrium acqui-
sition price and the innovation reward. Part (i) illustrates the downward sloping net value of
preemption and the net value of entry deterrence. Part (ii) illustrates for what values of c entry
an entry deterring acquisition or a preemptive acquisition takes place. Part (iii) illustrates the
eﬀects on the reward of increasing compatibility.
23reduces the eﬀort to innovate and the probability of successful innovation. This negative eﬀect
tends to be the strongest when the entrepreneurial ﬁrm is acquired under bidding competition.
5.3 When is compatibility desirable?
Let us now make some remarks on compatibility policy and welfare. To this end, we add a
stage zero where the government contemplates a policy which forces ﬁrms to make products
compatible. To simplify the presentation, we make the following assumptions:
• Compatibility policy (henceforth denoted the C-policy) states that products are to be
made compatible only if the innovation k succeeds (and the entrepreneurial ﬁrm commer-
cializes the innovation in stage 2).
• If the entrepreneurial ﬁrm fails, the symmetric incumbents will not agree on compatibility,
say, because of ﬁxed costs of making the product compatible (which we normalize to zero).
• Let the innovation quality be suﬃciently high and the network eﬀects be suﬃciently strong
to have the entrepreneurial ﬁrm sell the innovation to an incumbent under preemptive
bidding competition at price S∗ = vii in the absence of compatibility, c = 0. When the
government imposes compatibility, it will use the minimum compatibility to enforce entry,
i.e. c = cPE + ε ≈ cPE.
Let us now compare the C-policy to a laissez-fair policy (henceforth denoted the L-policy)
where no commitment to compatibility is made. The conventional welfare evaluation of M&As
and market structures is typically made by comparing the sum of consumer surplus and proﬁts
in diﬀerent market structures. We follow this approach. Denote the expected welfare un-
der the L-policy as   W(i) = ρ∗(i)W(i)+ [1 − ρ∗(i)]W(0), where W(i) is the welfare when the
entrepreneurial ﬁrm is successful, and W(0) is the welfare under a failure by the entrepre-




W(0), where WC(e) is the welfare under entry, and W(0) is once more the welfare
under a failure (where compatibility is not enforced).
Deﬁning the diﬀerence in expected welfare   WC−L =   W(e) −   W(i), and rearranging terms,
we obtain:




      
(+): Entry with comp.
− ρ∗(e) [W(i) −W(0)]
      
(+): Sale without comp
      
Change in expected welfare
￿ 0 (16)
Even if the welfare is higher under compatibility, WC(e) > W(i), when the entrepreneurial
ﬁrm succeeds, expected welfare can be reduced under the compatibility policy,   WC−L < 0, since
the probability of an innovation can be signiﬁcantly lower under the C-policy, ρC(e) < ρ∗(e). As
shown in Corollary 2, the reason for this is the signiﬁcant loss of revenue for the entrepreneurial
ﬁrm arising from not being able to extract incumbents’ full willingness to pay from selling the
innovation under bidding competition. This can be seen by comparing the reward to innovation
RE for c = 0 and c = cPE in Figure 7(iii).
24Let us now examine the eﬀect on consumers, incumbents and the entrepreneurial ﬁrm. Note
that
  WC−L =   CSC−L +   ΠC−L
I +   ΠC−L
E . (17)
In (17),   CSC−L =   CSC −   CS is the change in expected consumer surplus from adopting the C-





Similarly,   ΠC−L
I =   ΠC
I −   ΠL
I is the change in aggregate expected incumbent proﬁts, with
  ΠL






ΠI(0). Finally,   ΠC−L
E =
  ΠC
E(e)−   ΠE(i) is the change in expected net income for the entrepreneurial ﬁrm, where   ΠC
E(e) ≡
ρC(e)vC
e − y(ρC(e)) and   ΠE(i) ≡ ρ∗(i)vii − y(ρ∗(e)), and where vC
e = ve|c=cPE and vii|c=0. We
can then rewrite (17) as follows:




      
(+): Entry with comp.
− ρ∗(i) [CS(i) − CS(0)]
      
(+): Sale without comp
      
Change in expected consumer surplus,   CSC−L ￿0
+ (18)
ρ∗(i)[ΠI(0) − ΠI(i)]
      






      
(+): Entry with c>0
      
Change in expected incumbent proﬁts,   ΠC−L
I ￿0
+
   ΠC
E(e) −   ΠE(i)
 
      
Loss for entrepreneurial ﬁrm,   ΠC−L
E <0
Analyzing this expression, we get the following result.
Proposition 5 Suppose that the government imposes a compatibility policy (C-policy) to pro-
mote entry. This will:
(i) lower the reward for the entrepreneurial ﬁrm, and the probability of a successful innova-
tion, ρC(e) < ρ∗(e),
(ii) lead to either an increase or a decrease in expected total and consumer welfare.
To see the intuition, observe that equation (18) is split into three parts. As shown by the
ﬁrst line in equation (18), the expected consumer surplus can be lower under the C-policy than
under the L-policy. Consumers are better oﬀ from the C-policy if the entrepreneurial ﬁrm
succeeds, since concentration is lower and products are compatible, CSC(e) > CS(i). But once
more, because compatibility reduces the bidding competition and the acquisition prices, the
innovation is less likely to succeed under the C-policy, ρC(e) < ρ∗(i).
The second line in equation (18) displays the aggregate proﬁts of incumbents. The ﬁrst
term shows the expected loss when the entrepreneurial ﬁrm commercializes the innovation
by selling to an incumbent under bidding competition under the L-policy, S∗ = vii. The
aggregate proﬁt when the entrepreneurial ﬁrm commercializes by sale is Π(i) = (n − 1)πN(i)+
πA(i)−vii = nπN(i), whereas the aggregate incumbent proﬁt under a failure is Π(0) = nπN(0).
Since the innovation reduces the proﬁts for non-acquiring incumbents, we have Π(0) − Π(i) =
n[πN(0) − πN(i)] > 0. The second term of the second line shows the corresponding loss in
aggregate proﬁts when the entrepreneurial ﬁrm commercializes by entry under the C-policy,
25where ΠC(e) = n
(n−1)
n πC
N(e) = (n −1)πC







where the ﬁrst terms illustrates the exit of one incumbent under entry. The expected loss due to
an acquisition by an incumbent can be larger since (i) the probability of success is signiﬁcantly
higher under a sale, ρ∗(i) > ρC(e) and (ii) the loss in aggregate proﬁt can be lower under entry
with enforced compatibility. The latter follows from Π(i)−ΠC(e) = πC
N(e)−n[πC
N(e)−πN(i)],
which can be positive since compatibility improves a non-acquiring incumbent’s competitive
position πC
N(e) > πN(i). Thus, aggregate proﬁts for incumbents could then be higher under
compatibility even when entry leads to the exit of one incumbent.
Finally, the third line in (18) displays the eﬀect on the entrepreneurial ﬁrm. As shown
in Figure 7 (iii), it directly follows that the entrepreneurial ﬁrm must be worse oﬀ from the
C-policy since the reward to innovation is reduced, vC
e < vii.
5.4 The long-run eﬀects of compatibility: preserving bidding competition
Ex-ante asymmetries between incumbents could make compatibility more desirable. While
earlier in this section, we pointed out a potential drawback of too much compatibility in the short
run, we can also show that compatibility could be an important tool for promoting entry and
ensuring bidding competition for entrepreneurial ﬁrms in the long run. A cost of monopolization
in network industries could be a reduction in innovation incentives because of a lack of bidding
competition for innovative entrepreneurial ﬁrms.
To see this, let us ﬁrst consider how our results on how network eﬀects aﬀect acquisition
prices and how the commercialization mode would be aﬀected by the presence of ex-ante asym-
metric incumbents. Suppose that there is initially one larger more eﬃcient incumbent d and
n−1 less eﬃcient symmetric incumbents. The dominating incumbent could be created by acqui-
sitions of previous innovations. The valuations for acquiring the entrepreneurial ﬁrm will then
diﬀer between incumbents and the auction game will, in general, be tedious to solve. A suﬃcient
condition for an acquisition, however, is that the net value of an entry deterring acquisition for
incumbent ﬁrm d is positive:
vd
ie − ve =
 
πd
A(i) − πE(e) + F
 
− πd
N(e) > 0. (19)
As long as dπd
A/dz is not suﬃciently lower than dπE/dz, network eﬀects will be conducive
to acquisitions by ﬁrm d if dπd
N(l)/dz is negative. If Assumptions 1 and 2 are fulﬁlled for the
other incumbent ﬁrms i  = d, a stronger network eﬀect can imply an acquisition under biding
competition where incumbent d bids the other incumbents’ preemptive value, vii. If we allow
ex-ante asymmetries between less eﬃcient incumbents, the exit game could also look diﬀerent:
the least eﬃcient ﬁrm would know that it would exit if it did not acquire the entrepreneurial
ﬁrm and hence, an acquisition would tend to be the equilibrium outcome if entry triggers exit.
Why is it then that ex-ante asymmetries between incumbents could make compatibility more
desirable? The reason is that if the incumbent d is dominating ex-ante and if the innovation
quality is not too high, it could be the case that the proﬁts of its rivals will decrease in network
eﬀects irrespective of who ends up owning the innovation.
Proposition 6 With asymmetric incumbents, increased compatibility can beneﬁt a smaller ﬁrm
26and therefore strengthen the bidding competition between incumbents over entrepreneurial ﬁrms.
In terms of equation (3), this occurs if the leading ﬁrm has a very low marginal cost ex-ante
and this cost advantage over rivals prevails if a rival wins the auction (or if the entrepreneurial
ﬁrm enters the market). Then, the direct eﬀect of stronger network eﬀects would be limited
for rivals even when they own the innovation. This might imply that rivals’ proﬁts always
decrease in network eﬀects,
dπA−d
dz < 0 and dπE
dz < 0. The dominating incumbent d would tend
to obtain the innovation at a very low price and monopolize the market. Since equation (13)
shows that increased compatibility can beneﬁt a smaller ﬁrm (as this ﬁrm gets a larger direct
proﬁt increase from access to a larger rival network), increased compatibility could be beneﬁcial
by either ensuring proﬁtable entry or guaranteeing a bidding competition between incumbents.
This suggests that a medium level of compatibility is likely to be desirable: too high a level
of compatibility could reduce the innovation eﬀorts as shown in Section 5.3, while too low a level
of compatibility could lead to asymmetric incumbents which weakens the bidding competition
for entrepreneurial ﬁrms.
6 Discussion and extensions
6.1 Innovations of lower quality
A central assumption in our model is that innovations are of suﬃciently high quality. Suppose
that we relax this assumption. First, consider innovations that generate market-neutral entry,
k ∈ (  k(e),˜ k). As shown in Figure 4 (iv), increasing the network strength from a very low initial
level, z ∈ [0, ˜ z(k)), will increase the proﬁt of a non-acquirer, dπN
dz > 0. Only when network
eﬀects become larger than the critical value ˜ z(k) do we observe a decrease in the proﬁt of a
non-acquiring incumbent, dπN
dz < 0. As shown in Figure 8(i), this will make the locus for the
net value of preemption ∆PE(z) = vii − ve = F − πN(i) and the net value of entry deterrence
∆ED(z) = vie − ve = F − n−1
n πN(e) U-shaped in network strength z. Both loci are then
downward-sloping when z ∈ (0, ˜ z(k)) and increasing when z ∈ (˜ z(k),zmax(k)). As shown in
Figure 8(ii), entry will then take place for medium network strengths, whereas acquisitions
occur at both low and very high network strengths.
6.2 Additional exits and tipping
What if we increase the network eﬀects beyond zmax(k)? When z = zmax(k) holds, ∆PE(z) =
∆ED(z) = F since πN(l) = 0. If we increase the network slightly from zmax(k), one incumbent
will exit. The remaining non-acquiring ﬁrm will make positive proﬁts. This implies that the net
value of entry-deterrence and preemption is reduced by πN(l) > 0. As shown in Figure 8, this
can lead to the commercialization mode shifting from acquisition to entry: that is, we might
have ∆PE(zmax(k)) = ∆ED(zmax(k)) = F > 0 while ∆PE(zmax(k) + ε) = F − πN(i) < 0 and




πN(e) < 0. While exits could lead to entry, it is still true that
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Figure 8: Illustrating the solution to the game when allowing for low-quality innovations. Part
(i) illustrates the net value functions, which are now U-shaped. Part (ii) illustrates that for
low quality innovations, we can have acquisitions when the network eﬀects are weak. Part (iii)
illustrates how the reward function varies across all commercialization modes.
28But what if the combination of network strength and innovation quality creates such a
strong position for the possessor that only the possessor will make positive proﬁts, πN(l) = 0?
Under such "tipping", we immediately see that a preemptive acquisition will take place since
∆PE = ∆PE = F > 0.
6.3 Entry is not market neutral
Market structure neutral entry says that the number of ﬁrms in the industry is the same before
and after entry. If the number of ﬁrms is allowed to vary, our results could be aﬀected. Suppose
that entry leads to a less concentrated market structure, i.e. if an acquisition occurs, n ﬁrms
are active in the market, whereas if entry occurs, n+1 ﬁrms are active. To this end, replace the
assumption of market structure neutral entry with the assumption that entry occurs without
the exit of incumbents. Now πA(i) can diﬀer from πE(e).
Since all incumbents remain in the market, the net value of preemption ∆PE(z) = vii − ve















The major change is that the eﬀects on the entrant and the acquirer of an increase in the
network eﬀect can diﬀer: dπA/dz  = dπE/dz. As long as dπA/dz is not suﬃciently lower than
dπE/dz, equation (20) will hold since dπN(l)/dz is negative. Our main results that stronger
network eﬀects (i) promote acquisitions over entry, (ii) generate bidding competition between
incumbents increasing the reward to innovation, and (iii) promote innovation incentives, will
thus also hold when entry is not market neutral.
6.4 Other selling mechanisms and licensing
In our setup, an acquisition takes place through a sealed-bid ﬁrst price auction with externalities.
The motivation for this is that we believe that it well captures bidding competition between
incumbents when acquisitions are used to gain access to new innovations. But potential rents
from using a more sophisticated mechanism are foregone. Jehiel and Moldovanu (1999) have
shown that sophisticated mechanisms might be needed to maximize the revenues in auctions
with externalities. It might be that all ﬁrms in the industry need to provide some transfers to
the seller. However, it is likely that more complicated mechanisms require the entrepreneurial
ﬁrm to have an unrealistically strong commitment power (Jehiel and Moldovanu (2000)).
Our results should be robust to incorporating licensing of the innovation instead of a full
acquisition of the entrepreneurial ﬁrm. If the entrepreneurial ﬁrm licenses the innovation to only
one incumbent, then licensing equals an acquisition in our model and our results go through
unchanged. Such a setting is natural when the innovation consists of an indivisible asset such
as human capital. If the entrepreneurial ﬁrm licenses the innovation to a large number of
incumbents or licenses the innovation and simultaneously enters the industry, our results could
be weakened. The seller must now determine how many licenses to sell. Allowing the seller to
commit to the number of licences to sell, Katz and Shapiro (1986) show that there exists an
equilibrium where some potential buyers are left without a licence. Consider a setting where
29the entrepreneurial ﬁrm can decide how many licences r to licence if not entering. Let πA(i,r)
denote the proﬁt of a buyer of a licence when there are r licenses for sale. Let πN(i,r) be
the proﬁt of a ﬁrm not buying a licence. Licensing by the entrepreneurial ﬁrm gives the proﬁt
  = r[πA(i,r) − πN(i,r)]. For simplicity, treating r as continuous, the optimal number of
licenses is:
 ′
r = [πA(i,r) − πN(i,r)]









In the Linear Cournot model, it can be shown that π′
A,r(i,r) − π′
N,r(i,r) < 0, π′
A,r(i,r) < 0
and π′
N,r(i,r) < 0, since more licenses increase aggregate output and lower the product market
price, which aﬀects a larger ﬁrm more adversely. Assuming that  ′′
rr < 0 and m is suﬃciently
large, there exists an optimal r∗ < m.
How does an increase in network eﬀects aﬀect the choice between licensing and entry? Deﬁne




















r = 0 from (21). So, we could have that d ∗
dz > dve
dz > 0 since
dπN(i,r∗)
dz < 0. Hence,
allowing for multiple licences to be sold, higher network eﬀects are conducive to selling multiple
licences rather than entering the market.
7 Concluding remarks
We have shown that network eﬀects amplify the preemptive motive for acquisitions of entre-
preneurial ﬁrms by increasing the relative beneﬁt of winning the bidding competition among
incumbents. This, in turn, leads to strong incentives to innovate to be acquired. We have also
established that increased compatibility in network industries with a market for entrepreneurial
ﬁrms can be counterproductive by lowering the equilibrium acquisition prices of entrepreneurial
ﬁrms by reducing the relative advantage of acquiring entrepreneurial ﬁrms.
Our ﬁndings suggest that policy makers should put more emphasis on acquisitions of entre-
preneurial ﬁrms when considering implementing compatibility requirements. A careful analysis
of the eﬀects of increased compatibility on bidding competition over innovative entrepreneur-
ial ﬁrms in the short run is warranted as too much compatibility can have negative eﬀects on
acquisition prices and thereby depress innovation incentives. In the long run, however, more
emphasis should be put on preserving the bidding competition for entrepreneurial ﬁrms: a cost
of monopolization in network industries is a removal of bidding competition for entrepreneurial
ﬁrms. Consequently, an intermediate level of required compatibility is likely to be optimal.
Our model also gives rise to several empirically testable predictions: (i) the ratio of acqui-
sitions to entry in network industries should be higher the stronger are the network eﬀects, (ii)
the implementation of policies increasing compatibility should decrease the ratio of acquisitions
to entry and reduce the pace of innovation in the short run, and (iii) total innovation output
30(e.g. patents) by potential innovative entrants should be higher when network eﬀects are strong.
Testing these predictions seems a fruitful avenue for further research, as well as extending the
model to allow for endogenously choosing compatibility, installed bases, sequential acquisitions,
and systems competition.
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Appendix
A Proof of Lemma 1 and 4
Here we will prove
• Lemma 1: with zero compatibility (c = 0) and with suﬃciently high-quality innovations
(k >   k), an increase in network eﬀects ampliﬁes the advantage of owning an innovation
in the linear Cournot model: dπA
dz > 0, dπE
dz > 0, and
dπN(l)
dz < 0.
• Lemma 4: with suﬃciently high-quality innovations (k > k), increased compatibility levels
the playing ﬁeld by reducing the advantage of acquiring the entrepreneurial ﬁrm: dπA
dc < 0,
dπE




We take as the starting point the model with both network eﬀects (z) and compatibility (c)
that was set up in Section 3 and extended in Section 5. Disregard ﬁxed operating costs τ and
recall that ﬁrm j faces a price of
Pj = a + z(  qj + c  q−j) − Q (23)




= Pj − δj − q∗
j = 0,∀j. (24)
The reduced-form proﬁt function for ﬁrm j is
πj(l) = [Pj(l) −δj]q∗
j(l) = [q∗
j(l)]2. (25)















      
SE
. (26)
The network size is Ψ∗
j(l) = q∗
j(l)+cq∗






direct eﬀect (DE) on the proﬁts of a higher price when the strength of the network increases,










j(l) represents the strategic eﬀect (SE)
arising from the change in price from a changing output of competitors.
There are three types of ﬁrms (h = {E,A,N}), the entering entrant (E), the acquiring
incumbent (A) and non-acquiring incumbents (N). The ﬁrm with the innovation thus has










where Λ = a−δ and ϕ = 1+ k
Λ is a relative measure of the size of the innovation, where ϕ′(k) > 0.
The variable φ = 2−z
1−cz maps network strength z and compatibility c between networks to the
strategic interaction between networks.
To show uniqueness, stability and existence of the Nash equilibrium, we consider a duopoly
with one non-acquiring incumbent and one acquiring incumbent/entrant (it is tedious, but
possible, to extend the proof to n non-acquiring incumbents). Using the assumption of market




(1−cz)(1+φ)(φ−1), while the proﬁt for the possessor is q∗
h =
Λ[φϕ−1]
(1−cz)(1+φ)(φ−1) for h = A,E.
As illustrated in Figure 6, which shows the Nash-Equilibrium under an acquisition, dRh
dqN = −1/φ
is the slope of the reaction function of the possessor of the innovation, whereasdRh
dqN = −φ is the
33slope of the reaction function of the non-acquirer. From this ﬁgure, φ > ϕ > 1 is required for
existence and φ > 1 guarantees stability.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 1
We ﬁrst show that under zero compatibility (c = 0) and with suﬃciently high quality innovations
(k >   k), an increase in network eﬀects ampliﬁes the advantage of owning an innovation in the
linear Cournot model: dπA
dz > 0, dπE












dz , we can study how network eﬀects aﬀect proﬁts by ex-








(1 − cz)[φ2 − 1]







(1 − cz)[φ2 − 1]
￿ 0 (30)
since φ > 1 and Ψh = q∗
h + cq∗
−h is the size of the possessor’s network while ΨN = q∗
N + q∗
−N is
















> 1, h = {A,E} (31)














Let us now turn to when
dπN(l)










where  (c) = (φ − c) +
(φϕ−1)
(φ−ϕ) (c − 1). It follows that the sign of
dq∗
N
dz in (30) and hence the
sign of
dπN(l)
dz > 0 depend on the expression  (c) = (φ − c) +
(φϕ−1)




φ−ϕ > 0,  (0) = φ−
φϕ−1
φ−ϕ ￿ 0 and  (1) = φ−c > 0. Hence, there exists a ˜ c ∈ (0,1) for
which
dπN(l)
dz > 0 holds for c > ˜ c. For c = 0 < ˜ c, we will now show that
dπN(l)
dz < 0 holds when
k >   k.
Figure 9 gives a proof when networks are incompatible, c = 0. To derive this ﬁgure, we
ﬁrst insert c = 0 in (32) and solve the combination of relative size of the innovation ϕ and
network interaction φ at which
dπN(l)
dz = 0. Denote this ϕ as ˆ ϕ(φ) =
φ2+1
2φ and note that ˆ ϕ(φ) is
increasing in φ. This is shown in Figure 9 where ˆ ϕ(φ) is depicted by the dotted line. It follows
that for ϕ > ˆ ϕ(φ), we have
dπN(l)
dz < 0, and for ϕ < ˆ ϕ(φ),
dπN(l)
dz > 0. Note again that ϕ < φ is
required for the existence of an equilibrium.
Figure 9 gives the inverse function z−1(φ) that maps network parameter φ to network
strength z, and maps the relative size of the innovation ϕ = 1 + k
Λ to its actual size k. In
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Figure 9: Illustrating the combination of parameter values for which non-acquiring incumbents’
proﬁts are reduced when there is an increase in the network eﬀects.
35and innovation size k at which
dπN(l)
dz = 0. Above the dotted line,
dπN(l)
dz < 0 holds, whereas
dπN(l)
dz > 0 holds below the dotted line. Since Lemma 1 assumes that c = 0, we have thus shown
that
dπN(l)
dz < 0 holds when k >   k, where   k is suﬃciently large.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 4
Here we show that for suﬃciently good innovations (k > k), increased compatibility levels the
playing ﬁeld by reducing the advantage of acquiring the entrepreneurial ﬁrm: dπA






















(1 −cz)[φ2 − 1]
> 0.
It can be checked that
φϕ−1






dc > 0. Next, recall that ϕ′(k) > 0. This implies that there exists a k such that
φ <
φϕ(k)−1
φ−ϕ(k) when k > k. Hence, for k > k it holds that
dq∗
h
dc < 0 and that dπA
dc < 0 and dπE
dc < 0.
B Proof of Lemma 2
First, note that bi ≥ maxvil, l = {e,i} is a weakly dominated strategy since no incumbent will
post a bid equal to or above its maximum valuation of obtaining the innovation and that ﬁrm
e will accept a bid, iﬀ bi > ve.
B.1 Inequality I1
Consider equilibrium candidate b∗ = (b∗
1,b∗
2,...,yes). Let us assume that incumbent w  = e is
the incumbent that has posted the highest bid and obtains the innovation and ﬁrm s  = d is the
incumbent with the second highest bid.
Then, b∗
w ≥ vii is a weakly dominated strategy. b∗
w < vii−ε is not an equilibrium, since ﬁrm
j  = w,e then beneﬁts from deviating to bj = b∗
w+ε, since it will then obtain the innovation and
pay a price lower than its valuation of obtaining it. If b∗
w = vii − ε, and b∗
s ∈ [vii − ε,vii − 2ε],
then no incumbent has an incentive to deviate. By deviating to no, the entrepreneurial ﬁrm’s
payoﬀ decreases since it foregoes a selling price exceeding its valuation, ve. Accordingly, the
entrepreneurial ﬁrm has no incentive to deviate and thus, b∗ is a Nash equilibrium.
Let b = (b1,,,bm,no) be a Nash equilibrium. Let incumbent h be the incumbent with the
highest bid. The entrepreneurial ﬁrm will then say no iﬀ bh ≤ ve. But incumbent j  = e will
have the incentive to deviate to b′ = ve + ε, since vie > ve. This contradicts the assumption
that b is a Nash equilibrium.
36B.2 Inequality I2
Consider equilibrium candidate b∗ = (b∗
1,b∗
2,...,y). Then, b∗
w ≥ vij is a weakly dominated
strategy. b∗
w < vij − ε is not an equilibrium since ﬁrm j  = w,e then beneﬁts from deviating to
bj = b∗
w +ε, since it will then obtain the innovation and pay a price lower than its valuation of
obtaining it. If b∗
w = vii−ε, and b∗
s ∈ [vii−ε,vii−2ε], no incumbent has an incentive to deviate.
By deviating to no, the entrepreneurial ﬁrm’s payoﬀ decreases since it foregoes a selling price
exceeding its valuation, ve. Accordingly, the entrepreneurial ﬁrm has no incentive to deviate
and thus, b∗ is a Nash equilibrium.
Consider equilibrium candidate b∗∗ = (b∗∗
1 ,b∗∗
2 ,...,no). Then, b∗
w ≥ vie is not an equilibrium
since the entrepreneurial ﬁrm would then beneﬁt by deviating to yes. If b∗
w ≤ ve, then no
incumbent has an incentive to deviate. By deviating to yes, the entrepreneurial ﬁrm’s payoﬀ
decreases since it then sells the innovation at a price below its valuation, ve. The entrepreneurial
ﬁrm has no incentive to deviate and thus, b∗∗ is a Nash equilibrium.
B.3 Inequality I3
Consider equilibrium candidate b∗ = (b∗
1,b∗
2,...,yes). Then, b∗
w ≥ vii is a weakly dominated
strategy. b∗
w < vii − ε is not an equilibrium since ﬁrm j  = w,e then beneﬁts from deviating to
bj = b∗
w + ε, since it will then obtain the innovation and pay a price lower than its valuation
of obtaining it. If b∗
w = vii − ε, and b∗
s ∈ [vii − ε,vii − 2ε], then no incumbent has an incentive
to deviate. By deviating to no, the entrepreneurial ﬁrm’s payoﬀ decreases, since it foregoes a
selling price exceeding its valuation, ve. Accordingly, the entrepreneurial ﬁrm has no incentive
to deviate and thus, b∗ is a Nash equilibrium.
Let b = (b1,...,bm,no) be a Nash equilibrium. The entrepreneurial ﬁrm will then say no
iﬀ bh ≤ ve. But incumbent j  = e will then have the incentive to deviate to b′ = ve + ε, since
vie > ve. This contradicts the assumption that b is a Nash equilibrium.
B.4 Inequality I4
Consider equilibrium candidate b∗ = (b∗
1,b∗
2,...,yes). Then, b∗
w > ve is not an equilibrium since
ﬁrm w would then beneﬁt from deviating to bw = ve. b∗
w < ve is not an equilibrium, since
the entrepreneurial ﬁrm would then not accept any bid. If b∗
w = ve − ε, then ﬁrm w has no
incentive to deviate. By deviating to b′
j ≤ b∗
w, ﬁrm j’s, j  = w,e, payoﬀ does not change. By
deviating to b′
j > b∗
w, ﬁrm j’s payoﬀ decreases since it must pay a price above its willingness to
pay vii. Accordingly, ﬁrm j has no incentive to deviate. By deviating to no, the entrepreneurial
ﬁrm’s payoﬀ decreases since it foregoes a selling price above its valuation, ve. Accordingly, the
entrepreneurial ﬁrm has no incentive to deviate and thus, b∗ is a Nash equilibrium.
Let b = (b1,,,bm,yes) be a Nash equilibrium. If bw ≥ vii, then ﬁrm w will have the incentive
to deviate to b′ = bw −ε. If bw < vii, the entrepreneurial ﬁrm will have the incentive to deviate
to no, which contradicts the assumption that b is a Nash equilibrium.
Let b = (b1,...,bm,no) be a Nash equilibrium. The entrepreneurial ﬁrm will then say no iﬀ
bh ≤ ve. But incumbent j  = d will have the incentive to deviate to b′ = ve + ε since vie > ve,
which contradicts the assumption that b is a Nash equilibrium.
37B.5 Inequalities I5 or I6
Consider equilibrium candidate b∗ = (b∗
1,b∗
2,...,no), where b∗
j < ve ∀j ∈ J. It then directly
follows that no ﬁrm has an incentive to deviate and thus, b∗ is a Nash equilibrium.
Then, note that the entrepreneurial ﬁrm will accept a bid iﬀ bj ≥ ve. But bj ≥ ve is a weakly
dominating bid in these intervals, since ve > max{vii,vie}.
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